“In the fourth year of the Russia–Ukraine War, victory is no longer defined by swift advances but by the ability to endure and outlast. As the battlefield hardens into a test of resources and resolve, the advantage tilts toward the side prepared for a longer war. In that calculus, time itself is emerging as Russia’s most strategic ally.”
In the fourth year (2025–2026), the Ukraine war entered into a defining phase that is less dramatic in territorial shifts, yet profoundly consequential in strategic terms. What began in 2022 as a fast-moving conflict evolved into a grinding, multidimensional war in which endurance, industrial capacity, and geopolitical alignment became more decisive than maneuver warfare. The fourth year, therefore, stands as a turning point — not because of a single event but because of a cumulative shift that increasingly aligned with Russia’s long-war doctrine.
By the fourth year, the human and material costs of the war had reached staggering proportions, reshaping Ukrainian society and testing the limits of state resilience. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), civilian casualties had exceeded 30,000 killed and injured by early 2026. The agency emphasized that: “The actual figures are likely considerably higher, as many casualties in areas of active hostilities remain unverified.” (Source: OHCHR Situation Report, January 2026)
Military losses are far more difficult to verify, but estimates cited by the Western defense officials, including those referenced in the United States Department of Defense (US DoD) briefings, suggest that combined casualties on both sides surpassed 700,000 by late 2025. Russian sources, including statements from the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, consistently argued that Ukrainian losses were disproportionately higher due to repeated offensive failures and structural disadvantages in manpower. In a briefing on December 19, 2025, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed: “The Ukrainian Armed Forces have lost more than 383,000 servicemen in 2024 alone, including killed and wounded, as a result of unsuccessful counteroffensive actions.” (Source: Russian Ministry of Defence briefing, December 19, 2025)
Earlier, the Ministry reported cumulative Ukrainian losses exceeding 444,000 troops since the start of the counteroffensive in June 2023, alongside the destruction of thousands of armored vehicles and artillery systems. (Source: Russian Ministry of Defence operational summaries, 2024–2025)
These figures, while disputed by Kyiv and Western officials, have been consistently used by Moscow to argue that Ukraine’s offensive strategies have resulted in high attrition rates without commensurate territorial gains, reinforcing Russia’s emphasis on a long-war strategy built around resource superiority and incremental advances. The destruction of infrastructure further compounded the crisis.
The World Bank estimated in its March 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery costs had exceeded $486 billion, a figure that continued to rise as the war dragged on.
In a somber reflection on the war’s toll, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on February 24, 2025: “Every day we pay for freedom with the lives of our people… the cost is immense, and the pain is real.” (Source: Presidential Address, Kyiv, February 24, 2025)
Yet by the fourth year, sustaining such losses became increasingly difficult for Ukraine, particularly as demographic pressures and economic constraints deepened. In contrast to the early phase of the war, characterized by rapid advances and setbacks, Russia’s approach in the fourth year reflected a deliberate shift toward long-term strategic endurance. President Vladimir Putin articulated this approach during his December 19, 2025 press conference saying: “We are not in a hurry. Our task is to achieve our objectives step by step, minimizing risks and preserving our forces.” (Source: Kremlin transcript, December 19, 2025)
This doctrine, prioritizing gradual gains over rapid breakthroughs, proved well-suited to the evolving nature of the conflict. Russia’s defense industry played a central role in this transition. By mid-2025, Western analysts acknowledged that Russian artillery production had reached levels significantly exceeding those of NATO countries combined. This industrial capacity enabled sustained bombardment along the frontlines, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where incremental advances were achieved through overwhelming firepower.
Moreover, Russia’s ability to mobilize and train additional forces ensured a steady flow of manpower. While initial mobilization efforts in 2022 faced challenges, by the fourth year, the system had stabilized, allowing Russia to maintain operational continuity. The battlefield this year bore little resemblance to the fluid movements of earlier phases. Instead, it became a network of fortified positions, trenches, and defensive lines stretching across hundreds of kilometers. Regions such as Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia witnessed intense but localized fighting, with both sides investing heavily in fortifications. The result was a war of attrition, where territorial gains were measured in kilometers rather than regions.
As noted in the February 2026 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies: “The conflict has evolved into a positional war, where advances are incremental and achieved at high cost, favoring the side with greater resources and endurance.” (Source: IISS Military Balance 2026)
This dynamic increasingly aligned with Russia’s strategic strengths.
While the frontlines remained static, the nature of warfare underwent a technological transformation. Ukraine expanded its use of long-range drones to strike targets deep inside Russia, including oil refineries, logistics hubs, and military installations. These operations aimed to disrupt supply chains and impose economic costs. However, Russia adapted quickly. By late 2025, it had developed layered air defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities that significantly reduced the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes.
At the same time, Russia expanded its own drone capabilities, integrating systems developed domestically and in cooperation with Iran. These drones were used extensively to target Ukrainian infrastructure and frontline positions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies observed: “Russia’s integration of drones with artillery and electronic warfare has created a persistent tactical advantage in contested zones.” (Source: IISS Military Balance 2026)
This technological adaptation underscored Russia’s ability to learn and evolve under battlefield conditions.
This year, energy infrastructure became one of the primary targets of the conflict. Russia conducted systematic strikes on Ukraine’s power grid, particularly during winter months, leading to widespread blackouts. These attacks not only disrupted daily life but also undermined industrial production and economic stability. Ukraine responded by targeting Russian oil facilities, seeking to reduce export revenues and weaken the Russian economy. Despite these efforts, Russia demonstrated resilience. It redirected energy exports toward markets in China and India, mitigating the impact of Western sanctions. The International Monetary Fund noted in its October 2025 World Economic Outlook: “Russia’s economy has shown greater resilience than initially expected, supported by energy exports and fiscal measures.” (Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2025)
This resilience weakened one of the West’s primary tools of pressure.
Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war effort depended heavily on support from the NATO and the European Union. However, by the fourth year, this support faced increasing challenges. In the United States Congress, debates over aid packages led to delays that affected Ukraine’s access to critical military supplies. European countries, dealing with economic pressures and domestic political divisions, also faced difficulties in maintaining consistent levels of support. Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged these challenges on June 14, 2025: “Support for Ukraine is not charity—it is an investment in our own security. But sustaining this support requires political will.” (Source: NATO Press Conference, Brussels, June 14, 2025)
Ukraine’s internal challenges became more pronounced in the fourth year. Mobilization efforts faced resistance, with reports of draft evasion and public dissatisfaction. Leadership changes within the military reflected underlying tensions over strategy and resource allocation. Economic conditions also remained difficult. Despite international aid, Ukraine’s economy continued to operate under wartime constraints, with significant portions of infrastructure damaged or destroyed. A Ukrainian lawmaker, quoted in a November 2025 report by BBC News, captured the situation: “We are fighting not only on the frontlines but also to keep our society functioning under immense strain.” (Source: BBC News Interview, November 2025)
These internal pressures highlighted the challenges of sustaining a prolonged war effort.
Contrary to expectations of isolation, Russia strengthened its ties with non-Western countries during the fourth year. Military cooperation with North Korea reportedly provided artillery ammunition, while economic and technological collaboration with China deepened. These relationships contributed to a broader geopolitical shift toward a multipolar world, in which Russia positioned itself as a key player outside the Western bloc.
The war’s impact extended far beyond Europe. Disruptions to grain exports affected food security in parts of Africa and Asia. At the same time, NATO increased its military presence along its eastern flank, reflecting concerns about potential escalation. The conflict thus became a central fault line in global geopolitics, influencing alliances, trade patterns, and security strategies. Despite the prolonged nature of the conflict, meaningful peace negotiations remained elusive. Ukraine continued to demand full restoration of its territorial integrity, while Russia sought recognition of its territorial gains and security guarantees. The Council on Foreign Relations observed in a January 2026 analysis: “Neither side currently sees negotiations as advantageous, making a near-term settlement unlikely.” (Source: CFR Backgrounder, January 2026)
This stalemate suggested that the war would continue for the foreseeable future.
While the battlefield map showed limited changes, the underlying dynamics of the war evolved in ways that increasingly favored Russia. Its advantages in manpower, industrial capacity, and strategic patience allowed it to sustain the conflict more effectively than Ukraine, which relied heavily on external support. The transformation of the war into a prolonged attritional struggle played to Russia’s strengths.
No decisive victory even in the fourth year for either side. Somehow, Ukraine was mostly on the losing end on different fronts including the support from its allies externally, besides the internal conflicts. But the year redefined the terms of the conflict. For Ukraine, the focus remained on survival and resistance. For Russia, the emphasis was on endurance, adaptation, and incremental gains. As President Vladimir Putin stated in December 2025: “History will judge not the speed of our actions, but the results we achieve.” (Source: Kremlin transcript, December 19, 2025)
In this prolonged contest, results are measured not in rapid advances but in the gradual accumulation of strategic advantage. By the end of the fourth year, the accumulation was though subtle but appeared to be tilting in Russia’s favor, underscoring the enduring relevance of patience, resilience, and industrial power in modern warfare.
The writer is an Executive Director, Devcom Centre for Geopolitical Studies, development expert and policy analyst focused on regional cooperation and climate diplomacy. His email: devcom.pakistan@gmail.com
