The war between Iran and the United States had barely subsided when the Houthis’ new advance in Yemen and missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia thrust the Middle East crisis into a stage where Yemen is no longer merely a separate war. From Najran to the Strait of Hormuz and from Tehran to Riyadh, seemingly distinct crises appear to be converging, while Pakistan is once again seeking a diplomatic path to achieve peace between these conflicting fronts.
In this volatile backdrop, Najran has assumed special importance because, at the end of the 1934 Saudi-Yemeni War, Saudi Arabia secured the regions of Najran, Jizan and Asir through the Treaty of Taif, while the Saudi army withdrew from the areas inside Yemen that it had captured during the war, and Yemeni authority was restored over Hodeidah and other areas. In effect, the present border is not merely a geographical line but also the result of a historical dispute.
Another dimension of Najran’s importance is the tribal bonds that exist on both sides of the border. According to a research report by the Sana’a Center, the social, religious and family ties between the Yam of Najran and certain tribal populations of northern Yemen are far older than the border; even during the Saada wars, some Yam tribal circles voiced solidarity with tribes across the border.
A deeply troubling development has emerged in the case of Yemen: the tribes of Najran went to the Houthis with a jirga and, pledging loyalty to the Houthis instead of Saudi Arabia, signalled that if the Houthis attacked Najran, they would be welcomed, which could become an extremely sensitive matter of internal security for Saudi Arabia. Amid this tension, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir touched down in Tehran on October 20, where he met President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and senior Iranian security official Mohsen Rezaei, among other important figures. The real issue here is Iran’s 7 conditions that it has placed before the United States. These include the lifting of US sanctions on Iranian oil, ending the blockade of Iranian ports, and stopping hostile activities in the region. Iran has also linked its offer to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 7 days to these conditions.
The other key side of this picture is Yemen, and the glimmer of hope regarding Field Marshal Asim Munir’s visit is that the Field Marshal must also have discussed assistance with the Iranians regarding the Houthis. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has confirmed that Tehran offered mediation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, but according to him, so far no response to this offer has been received from Saudi Arabia or the Houthis, which is certainly baffling because Iran’s influence over the Houthis is no secret.
A day earlier, on October 19, at a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Abbas Araghchi underscored the same broader point, saying that regional issues would not be resolved militarily and that Gulf security should be a regional arrangement that does not depend on foreign forces. Russia also supported a negotiated solution and made clear that it would continue its strategic cooperation with Iran.
But the reality on the ground is outrunning diplomacy. The Houthis are claiming to strike Saudi targets, airports and energy infrastructure, while threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman have also rattled the global energy market.
Amid this escalation, Britain has announced that it will deploy RAF Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. According to the British Ministry of Defence, these aircraft will be used in a defensive role to shield Saudi cities and important installations from aerial attacks; however, they will not carry out offensive strikes against the Houthis.
For now, the brightest ray of hope is that the door of communication between Washington and Tehran has not been completely closed and Pakistan is active in this communication. But if the Yemen front begins to connect with internal social and tribal matters along the Saudi border, or if Houthi attacks on energy and urban centres escalate further, then the crisis will no longer remain only between Iran and the United States. Najran, Yemen, the Strait of Hormuz and Saudi Arabia could then become different theatres of the same regional crisis.
Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned in his statement on October 18 that in the event of any new military action by the United States and Israel, the Iranian armed forces are poised to hit back harder than before. According to Tasnim News Agency, Rezaei said that the continuous threats by US and Israeli officials cannot alter the realities on the ground. He further said that Iran has prepared a plan for responding to any new adventurism that is far more devastating than the previous 12-day and 40-day wars.
Yet Pakistan’s mediation efforts are continuing, and both Iran and the United States understand very well that continuous military operations can inflict damage on the opposing side, but they cannot make the achievement of political objectives easier. Iran faces challenges related to its security, sovereignty and economic difficulties, while it will not be easy for the United States to ignore regional stability, the protection of its allies, maritime trade and the broader economic and political consequences of the war. If the parties want to avoid further destruction, economic pressure and regional instability, they will have to come to the table to discuss a ceasefire, security guarantees, the protection of maritime traffic and a verifiable resolution of disputes. Ultimately, for both Iran and the United States, negotiations are the only path that can provide the basis for ending the war and achieving a durable political settlement.
