Iran-US Standoff: Calm Before the Storm?

U.S. President Donald Trump once again signaled possible military action against Iran on October 23, 2026, while U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack also said that the United States may strike Iran later this week. Following Barrack’s statement, Trump told reporters that he was unaware of any such potential action. Earlier, Trump had announced that the United States would not attack Iran before the U.S. midterm elections scheduled for November 3. On the other hand, Iran has warned that if the United States and Israel attack again, it could target key installations and undersea communication cables in the Gulf region, bringing the world’s systems to a standstill. In this situation, an important question is what will happen to U.S. technology companies, data centers, and billions of dollars in investments located in Gulf countries. Companies such as Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google are expanding digital and artificial intelligence infrastructure in the region. In such circumstances, if the war spreads or intensifies, these investments could come under threat. In this context, the question may also be raised whether Israel wants to take advantage of such a situation to compel Gulf countries to rely further on agreements such as the Abraham Accords for their security, while new opportunities could emerge for American companies and investors in post-war reconstruction.
On the other hand, Israel has signaled that it may further intensify its military operations and harsh measures in the occupied West Bank. On October 23, two Israeli soldiers were killed and three were injured in an attack near Hebron, after which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed a large-scale military operation in the relevant area, searches of homes, the seizure of weapons, and the destruction of what he described as military infrastructure. Soon after, Israeli bulldozers began demolishing some houses. Netanyahu’s position that the deployment of Israeli forces in Gaza could continue even after the elections is part of a broader policy under which Israel has continued to make its military withdrawal from Gaza conditional on Hamas disarming and the establishment of future administrative arrangements. This situation has heightened fears about the Israeli military presence in Palestinian territories and further harsh measures in the West Bank.
According to Larry C. Johnson, a former analyst at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and a former official in the U.S. State Department’s counterterrorism division, the United Arab Emirates has so far quietly kept back-channel contact with Iran to ensure that it is not attacked, in exchange for which the UAE is believed to have struck some financial or support arrangements behind the scenes.
Israel has long described Iran’s nuclear programme and missile capabilities as a threat to itself. However, this time, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has floated the claim that Iran is about to build a nuclear bomb and poses security threats to Israel. It appears that Israel, too, is poised to attack Iran under the pretext of protecting its own security.
An important aspect of this conflict is also U.S. domestic politics. On October 9, Donald Trump said that the United States would not attack Iran before the November 3 midterm elections, while on October 23, his own ambassador, Tom Barrack, did not rule out a possible attack. This contradiction sows confusion over U.S. policy. Barrack also made it clear that the Trump administration’s objective is not necessarily regime change in Iran, but rather to reduce regional threats. The results of the U.S. elections could influence the president’s political position and decisions regarding the war. However, Iran and the United States have ramped up preparations and military exercises for war, indicating that an attack by either side may now be only a matter of time.
The background of diplomatic efforts between Iran and the United States is also important because the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding reached in June 2026 kept the door open for further discussions on issues such as a ceasefire, the movement of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, and the nuclear programme. However, disagreements between the parties and renewed tensions following the ceasefire have undermined this process. Disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz could increase global oil supply risks, insurance costs, and transportation expenses. The effects would not be limited to the United States or Gulf countries; oil-importing countries, including Pakistan, are also impacted directly.
The inclusion of data centers and artificial intelligence infrastructure in this conflict is no longer mere conjecture. On October 23, Reuters disclosed that Iranian officials had discussed plans to target undersea communication cables in the Gulf in the event of a possible new war. Iranian officials have already identified data centers and artificial intelligence facilities with U.S. links as potential targets. In September 2026, Microsoft announced that it would invest more than $10 billion in the Middle East by 2030, while Amazon Web Services, Google, and Oracle are also involved in digital infrastructure projects in the Gulf region. Therefore, the effects of any new war could ripple beyond military installations to the internet, financial transactions, business services, and the global digital economy.
Ultimately, it is not sufficient to view the current tensions between Iran, the United States, and Israel solely in terms of possible airstrikes. The security of Gulf countries, U.S. domestic politics, Israel’s regional strategy, global energy supplies, and digital investments are also intertwined with this situation. If diplomatic efforts fail to deliver a breakthrough, the effects of a new war could engulf the entire region.